The Extent of an Accountant\u27s Liability to Third Parties by Andrew, Brian
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Business - Accounting & Finance 
Working Papers Faculty of Business and Law 
1989 
The Extent of an Accountant's Liability to Third Parties 
Brian Andrew 
University of Wollongong, bandrew@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/accfinwp 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew, Brian, The Extent of an Accountant's Liability to Third Parties, School of Accounting & Finance, 
University of Wollongong, Working Paper 12, 1989. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/accfinwp/133 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTANCY
THE EXTENT OF AN ACCOUNTANT'S
LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES
by Brian H Andrew
July 1989
WORKING PAPER NO. 12
THE EXTENT OF AN ACCOUNTANT'S
LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES
Brian H Andrew
B.Com., M.Com.(Hons), B.Leg. S.,
Principal Lecturer
and Head - Division of Professional Accounting
and Commercial Administration
Macarthur Institute of Higher Education
1
law of tort.





Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd. v
[ 1]
of
as •••• the precedent for
But the duty of care owed under a contract
House
Accountants normally owe a duty of care to their
been described
Since the
Heller and Partners Ltd
[1] [1964] A.C. 465
liability.
In interpreting this duty the courts have been aware of the
professional persons owing a duty of care to third parties for
the consequences of negligent mis-statements, accountants have
been concerned with the extent of this duty and their potential
The Extent of an Accountant's Liability to Third Parties
law of contract [2].
this duty has become clear from a range of cases concerning the
[2] See for example Foment0 (Sterling Area) Ltd v Selsdon
Fountain Pen Co. Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 45, Re Thomas Gerrard &
Son Ltd [1968] C.R. 445, Pacific Acceptance Corporation
Ltd v Forsythe Ors (1970) 92 W.N. (N.S.W) 29 and Cambridge
Credit Corporation Ltd v Hutcheson and Ors, (1985) 2 ACLC
263.
client as a term of the contract of engagement and the extent of
may be different in kind to that owed to a third party under the
[3] Ultramares Corporation v Touche et al (1931) 225 N.Y. 170 at
179.
by Cardozo C. J. t that the recognition of a duty might
now famous concern as to the extent of the liability expressed
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class·.[3] This
warning of Cardozo C.J. concerning unlimited
has
apparently taken to heart by U.S. courts, as the Ultramares case
and deceit actions for at least thirty years' [4], despite the
earlier decision of the same judge in Glanzer v Shepherd [5],
which indicated that a person could be held responsible to a
third party for damages suffered as a result of reliance on
--------.
negligent advice. These developments in U.S. common law were of
some significance in the Hedley Byrne case as Lord Reid referred
to both Ultramares and Glanzer in his judgment, [6] and the
Ultramares case has played a significant part in the development
of negligence actions in Britain. [7]
British Commonwealth courts were late in adopting the
principle of liability to third parties for negligent statements,
but the Hedley Byrne decision has had considerable impact in a'
range of different situations since handed down in 1964.
Accountants were first affected only 10 years ago with the
decision, in 1976, of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Haig v Bamford et al (8].
------------------------
This was followed in 1978 by the
[4] Pockson J.R.H.H., Accountants' Professional Negligence, The
Macmillan Press Ltd, London & Basingstoke, (1982), p. 101.
[5] (1922) 233 N.Y. 236





[7] Cohen L.J. at p. 207 as support for the denial of
and Denning L.J. at p. 183 in his dissenting
in Candler v Crane Christmas and Company [1951] 2
[8] (1976) 72 D.L.R. (3rd) 68
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above, and which has bothered all Commonwealth Courts since


















Commonwealth cases on an accountant's duty to third parties in
of the Court of Appeal in JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks, Bloom & Co.
Scott Group Ltd v McFarlane [9], and more recently the decision
accounting profession. [12]
Twomax v Dickson, Mc Farlane & Robinso~, [11]. These two recent
the extent of duty revealed by the cases.
accordance with the apparent rule in Hedley Byrne, and examines
the unlimited liability problem which concerned Cardozo C.J.
[11] (1983) Scots Law Times Reports 98
[9] (1978) 1 N.Z.L.R. 553
[10] (1983) 1 All E.R. 583
support for, a logical limit to the duty, which attempts to balance
Hedley Byrne, with the need to protect the community from
[12] See for example C. Baxter, New professional negligence
liability judgement - an auditor's nightmare, Accountancy,




The problem of determining the extent of an accountant's
liability for statements made in the course of carrying on the
profession, is a common problem in the law of torts. A tort is a
civil wrong, and tort law is concerned with providing
compensation to a plaintiff who suffers damage as a result of the
actions of another party who owes a duty of care to the
plaintiff. Compensation, not punishment of a wrong doer, is the
essence of tort law, and there must be some limit upon the extent
of liability consistent with the need to compensate the victim
and the community interest in keeping an (otherwise) viable
business in operation. No-one is likely to be well served by
bankrupting a tort feasor and the unlimited liability problem
raised by Cardozo C.J. has concerned all common law courts.
The notion of negligence as a separate basis of tort
liability can be traced to the early part of the nineteenth
century. Its earliest source can be seen in relation to a
limited number of callings, such as innkeepers, carriers,
surgeons and attorneys, where the practitioners held themselves
out to the public, as possessing a level of competence sufficient
for the pursuance of their 'professions'. Such persons were
required to perform their functions in accordance with a standard
of 'reasonable skill and competency', and were held responsible
for certain, but not all, harm resulting from their negligence.
Inherent in the liability was the idea of a person, such as a
4
surgeon. owing a duty to take care in the performance of the
professional activity, and this duty was owed to clients and to a
limited class of other persons affected by the action of the
'professional'.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth century tort law
developed as a series of separate duty relationships expressed in
the form. 'An occupier owes the following duty to an
invitee •••• '. and there was considerable debate about whether
there was any general law of negligence. But in 1932 the
decision of the House of Lords in the famous Donoghue v Stevenson
[13] case provided a unifying point for negligence actions and
"This famous decision first treated negligence as a tort in
itself" [14] • In his judgment Lord Atkin made the now famous
general statement about the duty of care in negligence actions:
·You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be
likely to injure your neighbour. Who. then. in law is
my neighbour? The answer seems to be - persons who are
so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so
affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or
omissions which are called in question" [15].
[13] [1932] A.C. 562
[14] Mr Justice K.S. Jacobs, Law & Fact in the Duty of Care, in
T. Simons (ed.) Negligence and Economic Torts, Selected
Aspects, Law Book Company Ltd., Sydney, 1980.
[15] Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562. per Lord Atkin at p.
619.
5
From the early cases the following elements of the cause of
action in negligence can be inferred:
1. A legally recognised duty to conform to a certain
standard of conduct.
2. Breach of the duty to exercise the required standard of
care.
3. Damage or material injury to the interests of the
plaintiff.
4. A reasonably proximate connection between
defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury.
the
Lord Atkin's 'neighbour principle' was an attempt to
formulate a general rule for determining the situations in which
a person who caused harm should be held to owe a duty of care to
the person harmed. But the principle was enunciated in a case of
personal injury suffered by the buyer of a faulty product and was
based upon a test of foreseeability which may be appropriate in
physical damage and personal injury cases but which may not be
easily transferable to cases involving economic loss resulting
from negligent mis-statements. The relationship between the
parties appears relatively clearer in the physical damage area
than is the relationship between an accountant who negligently
issues an incorrect audit opinion and a user of the accounts who
suffers loss through reliance on the accounts; and the same tests
of foreseeabi.lity may not be appropriate in both sets of cases.
6
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The Duty of Care
consequence of the act complained of and is the complainant
a 'foreseeable' victim of the act? This dual dimension to the
foreseeability rule is of considerable importance in determining
a logical limit to the extent of an accountant's duty to third
parties.
In other words, is the damage a 'foreseeable'complained of.
The duty issue involves a mixed question of law and fact
which must be resolved before any liability can arise and, in the
negligence cases generally, the courts have tended to expend most
effort in addressing legal questions about the existence and
quality of a notional duty of care. In this regard it is
regrettable that Commonwealth courts have tended to take the view
that a unified approach should be applied in economic loss,
physical damage and personal injury cases and to adopt a similar
approach to determining the duty question in all these areas.
A further complicating feature of the test of
'foreseeability' proposed under Lord Atkin's 'neighbour
principle' is that it could be applied to two different aspects
of the action which gave rise to liability, firstly, whether or
not the act complained of could be 'reasonably foreseen' as
likely to produce the damage complained of and secondly, whether
or not the plaintiff could be 'reasonably foreseen' to be a
member of the class of personS likely to be affected by the act
This approach was a feature of the influential judgment of
economic loss cases described as 'the trilogy of cases in this
where he brought together personal injury, physical damage and
in a
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" ••• the position has now been reached that in order to
establish that a duty of care arises in a particular
situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts of
that situation within those of previous situations in
which a duty of care has been held to exist. Rather
the question has to be approached in two stages.
First, one has to ask whether, as between the alleged
wrong doer and the person who has suffered damage
there is a sufficient relation of proximity or
neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable
contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part
may be likely to cause damage to the latter, in which
case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if
the first question is answered affirmatively, it is
necessary to consider whether there are any
considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or
limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to
whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it
may give rise •••• • [18]
Lord Wilberforce in Anns v Merton London Borough Council [16]
House, Donoghue v Stevenson, Hedley Byrne & Co ~td v Heller and
generalisation aimed at determining the duty question:
Partners Ltd and &)me Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd' [17]
[16] [1978] A.C. 728
[17] per Lord Wilberforce at p.751
[18] ibid
This suggests the application of a simple 'foreseeability'
(reasonable contemplation) test in all negligence actions
and it also suggests that the onus of disproving a duty of
care could be shifted to the defendant when a
'neighbourhood I relationship is established. As will be
seen, this speech of Lord Wilberforce has been cited and
relied upon in the two most recent British cases concerning
an accountant's liability to third parties, and it has
become an important statement of principle which is likely
to be followed by courts in determining the duty question.
This unified approach is unsatisfactory as there are a
number of substantive differences between economic loss,
physical damage and personal injury cases which justify a
different approach in each area; not the least of which is
the qualitative difference between injury to a person, which
can never be compensated by money, and economic loss which
may be insured against and can be fully compensated by a
money payment. A further important practical difference
between the physical damage and personal injury cases and
the economic loss cases is the issue of remoteness, the
problem identified by Cardozo C. J. above of exposing the
defendant to an indeterminate liability; and this is the key
to any logical limit to the accountants' liability.
9
accountants to an indeterminate liability, as the manufacturer of
the faulty product was held responsible to members of the class
the information was supplied.
exposewould
There are several
Donoghue v Stevenson [19]inAtkin
Adoption of the same foreseeability test as enunciated by
Lord
potential users of accounting reports.
possible alternatives to this approach, involving limiting the
duty to a specific known user or a specific foreseeable user or
Any test should be based upon commercial and business
to all members of a foreseeable class of users, but a suitable
of users of the product, and there are so many different
approach should have regard to the relationship between the
supplier and the user of information and the purpose for which
practices as well as the foreseeability of loss and should focus
upon the circumstances surrounding the loss. A test which aims
to determine the supplier of information's liability in a
reasonably balanced way should focus on two factors, a known use
of the information and use by a foreseeable user. It is argued
here that primary emphasis should be placed on the specific
permissible use of information and use in the type of transaction
for which it was supplied rather than upon the class of users to






chief shareholder S. Scholler had used the audited accounts in an
In the
accountants
The defendant firm of
He also found the
At the trial the judge held that the
negligently prepared audit opinion.
a third party who had lost money through reliance on a
[20] (1976) 72 D.L.R. (3rd) 68
[21] (1972) 32 D.L.R. (3rd) 73
[22] per Mc Pherson J. at p. 75
occurred in the Canadian case of Haig v Bamford et a1 [20], where
the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously held an auditor liable to
for the firm of Scholler Furniture and Fixtures Ltd, and the
auditor's liability to third parties for negligent mis-statement
An often overlooked but most important case concerning an
Saskatchewan Court of Queens Bench, McPherson J. found that the
attempt to obtain more capital for the business.
accountants had prepared a set of accounts and an audit report
defendants knew that the accounts "would be used by Sedco
whom the company was doing business, and by a potential investor
in equity capital" [21].
negligent in that "They had not done an audit and they should
[23] ibid, at p , 77
have said so" [22] rather than attaching an audit opinion to the
the category of persons who could be foreseen by the defendants
their economic interests" [23], in other words because he was a
unaudited accounts.
as relying on exhibit p. 5 (the accounts) in a matter affecting
defendants owed a duty to Haig because "he must be included in
(Saskatchewan Economic Development Corporation), by the bank with
foreseeable user of the accounts, i.e. 'a potential investor in
equity capital'.
In the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal the decision of
McPherson J. was overturned in a majority judgment, following the
principle that :
" •••had the appellants been aware that the respondent
existed as a prospective investor and that the
statements would specifically be shown to him they
would on the basis of Lord Denning's judgment be
liable" [24].
But the appellants were not aware of Haig's existence or that the
accounts would be shown to'him so "they owed the respondent the
duty to be honest and are not liable to him for negligence" [25]
The test proposed by the Court of Appeal majority would be the
most restrictive test posssible, as it focused exclusively upon a
third party user, requiring actual knowledge of the identity of
the specific user before a duty of care arose.
This view was overturned by unanimous decision, of the
Supreme Court of Canada, where the leading judgment of Dickson J.
was followed without additional comment by five members of the
bench; whilst two members agreed with Martland J., who offered a
different ratio but agreed with Dickson J. in the disposition of
the appeal. This division on the ratio in the case is of some
[24] (1974) 53 D.L.R. (3rd) 85, per Hall J.A. at p. 99
[25] ibid t p, 102
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importance as Martland J. and his concurring brethren were
concerned to determine the matter by reference to the fact
that:
"the respondents knew, prior to the completion
of the financial statement, that it would be
used by Sedco, by the bank with which the
company was doing business and by a potential
investor in equity capital, the respondents owed
a duty of care, in the preparation of that
financial statement, to that potential investor
(the appellant), even though they were not aware
of his actual identity" [26].
This decision over-ruled the Court of Appeal's narrow
'specif ic known user' test and substituted a duty of care
owed to any member of a known class of users. This decision
returned to McPherson J I S notion of a duty owed to a
foreseeable member of a known class of users, a breadth of
potential liability argued above to be appropriate but
insufficient as the sole test of liability.
The majority judgement, read by Dickson J., seems more
in line with the test of liability suggested here, in that
there were ten references (including those quoted from other
cases) to the use that was to be made of the information.
The majority judgement was concerned with the indeterminate
liability problem, as Dickson J. observed that:
"It does not necessarily follow that the doors
must be thrown open and recovery permitted
whenever someone's economic interest suffers as
the result of a negligent act on the part of an
accountant ". [27]
[26] (1976) 72 D.L.R. (3rd) 68, per Martland J. at p.69
[27] (1976) 72 D.L.R. (3rd) 68, per Dickson J. at p.74
13
The decisive consideration was that 'the accounts were prepared
for the guidance of a "specific class of persons", potential
investors, in a "specific class of transactions", the investment
of $20,000 of equity capital.' [28] Thus, the accountants knew
that the accounts were required for a specific purpose and of the
limited class of users and, most importantly, they had a clear
idea of their potential liability, i.e. $20,000.
Thus, it was of considerable importance that the accounts
were prepared for a 'special purpose' [29] and 'What was
important was the nature of the transaction or transactions for
which the statements were intended, for that is what delineated
the limits of potential liability" [30], but unfortunately this
does not appear to be part of the ratio in the case. The
ratio appears to have been limited to a rejection of the Court of
Appeal's narrow interpretation of the idea of duty owed only to a
specific known user [31]. The judgment can, however, be seen as
consistent with the test proposed above in that the intended use
of the information and the existence of a limited class of users
were both known to the accountants, and both of these factors
apparently influenced the Supreme Court majority, who were
concerned by the problem of indeterminate liability and aware of
the need to find a suitable limit to liability.
------------------------
[28] ibid at p. 76
[29] ibid at p. 74
[30] ibid at p. 76
[31] see p. 75
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There is nothing peculiarly Canadian about this case, as the
Court cited the leading English authorities on negligent mis-
statements and was affected by the unifying tendency of the
British law of negligence, as noted in Anns v Merton [32] above.
They were also aware of the indeterminate liability problem and
cited the leading u.s. cases, and they appeared to be aware of
the U.S. tendency to divide the tort of negligence into
a number of separate categories dealing with physical damage,
personal injury and economic loss as different cases. This was
a landmark decision in being the first court of final appeal in
any common law jurisdiction to find that an accountant could owe
a duty of care to a third party. It was also the first
Commonwealth Court Case to result in an an award of damages to a
third party who had suffered economic loss through reliance
on negligent words. At this time it is one of only two
Commonwealth cases where an accountant has been found to owe a
duty of care to a third party and where there was an award of
damages to the injured party, i.e. where all the elements of the
tort of negligence were found to have been proven. In the next
two cases considered here the Courts found negligence, the
existence of a duty of care and breach of the duty, but no
sufficiently proximate relationship between the accountant's
negligence and the plaintiff's loss as to justify an award of
damages.
[32] op.cit, note 16
15
The second important case concerning accountants is the well
known decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in
Scott Group Ltd v McFarlane [33]. and this case appears to have
further widened the scope of an auditor's possible liability for
negligence. In this case the defendant auditors had given an
unqualified audit opinion each year for John Duthie Holdings Ltd;
despite being aware of some deficiencies in the group accounts
arising form the different balance dates of the holding company
and its subsidiaries. The plaintiff company had relied upon
these audit reports in acquiring John Duthie. but after the take-
over it was found that Duthie's bank overdraft was understated by
$38.000. The defendant auditors did not deny the error. or their
responsibility for detecting it. However. Quilliam J. of the New
Zealand Supreme Court dismissed the claim, holding that published
accounts were for the benefit of shareholders. not third parties.
and the auditor's principal responsibility arose from a
contractual and statutory responsibility to shareholders.
[33] op.cit note 9, this case is discussed in an article by
A.G. Davidson, Auditors' Liability to Third Parties for
Negligence, Accounting & Business Research, Autumn 1982.
16
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The New Zealand Court of Appeal reversed the decision of
that they were liable, for their negligence to the third parties
who had relied upon their opinion in preparing the takeover bid
for the auditors' client company. The auditors were not aware of
the bid at all, but the majority of the Court found them liable
for their negligence, as they could be expected to contemplate
such a bid because of the state of their client, and thus the
Holding
The position in
Quilliam J., on the issue of the auditor's liability.
offeror was a foreseeable user of the accounts.
respect of individual purchasers of shares was left open, but if
this approach was followed by the courts then auditors would
appear to be the professional group most affected by the. Hedley
Byrne decision. An audit report is a public document which
provides a large number of financial statement users with
information on the reliability of the audited accounts. The
auditor's opinion may be relied upon by creditors, investors,
employees and customers, and all of these users of the
information contained in the accounts could reasonably be
foreseen as likely to be influenced by the auditor's opinion.
Thus, the potential liability arising from the Scott Group case
may be vast, though a limit to the liability appears in the case,
as a majority of the Appeal Court held the auditors liable, but a
different majority ruled the complainant had not proved that they
had suffered any compensatable damage, because of the lack of a
causal link between the default of the auditors and the damage,
suffered by the plaintiff.
A further limit to the extent of duty may arise from a
somewhat unsatisfactory feature of the case, the existence of
three different judgments, each based upon a different test of
liability. The most dangerous of the three judgments was that of
Woodhouse J, who asserted in regard to the duty of care:
"The issue has been made increasingly complex by the
successive and varying formulas that have been used in
an effort to confine the general area of
responsibility, in particular for negligent words or in
respect of purely economic losses. At this initial
stage at least it should be possible to remove some
degree of uncertainty - in my opinion it is done by the
comprehensible and straightforward test of
foreseeability" [34].
He, rather lightly, dismissed the indeterminate liability problem
stating that:
• ••• 1 do not think that the imposition of
responsibility for negligent advice would lead to an
intolerable burden upon auditor defendants. There is
the initial need to establish a duty of care situation
in terms of the critical requirement of reasonable
foresight; and then there is the need to provide
evidence in terms of causation. 1 am satisfied that
these matters alone would prevent any risk of an open-
ended type of duty· [35].
[34] per Woodhouse J. at p. 574




bid, as he said:
Cooke J. was
[36] ibid. at p. 576
'A company purchasing all or the majority of the shares
is more directly and closely affected than, for
instance, an ordinary purchaser of shares on the stock
market. And in all ordinary circumstances there will
in fact be only one offeror who makes a successful
take-over offer on the basis of the carelessly
certified accounts' [37].
But, fortunately for accountants, Woodhouse J. was in the
Cooke J. agreed with Woodhouse J. in holding that there had
the award of damages. His reasoning appears to favour liability
members in significant matters affecting the company assets &
potential users except the ordinary members of the investing
to use and rely upon them when dealing with the company or its
in a broad range of 'commercial arrangements' and includes a
minority in holding for the appelants on both the duty issue and
[37] per Cooke J. at p. 582
business' [36], and such a test would appear to include all
plaintiffs had not discharged the onus of proving that the
third party plaintiffs, but agreed with Richmond P. that the
been negligence by the accountants who owed a duty of care to the
'duty to those persons whom they can reasonably foresee will need
in the majority in refusing the plaintiff's claim.
wishing to limit the accountants' liability by reference to the
accountants' negligence was causative of their loss and he was
special position of a share buyer who succeeds in a take-over
concerned by the problem of indeterminate liability, apparently
This judgment exhibited some concern to limit liability by
reference to a reasonably foreseeable use of the information, as
Cooke J. observed "that it was a takeover transaction and
moreover a reasonably foreseeable one" [38] and he found that
"It was a classic case for a takeover or merger" [39]. Taking
this approach he found that "the evidence discloses a plain risk
of a takeover and the virtual certainty that in such an event the
accounts would be relied upon by the offeror" [40]. These
observations suggest a test of duty based upon an actual member
of a foreseeable class of users who use the information for a
foreseeable purpose, a test which is somewhat more inclusive than
that suggested above but at least recognises the importance of
the intended use of the information. Cooke J. was of the opinion
that "the damages are also necessarily limited" [41] and that
"In relation to members of the public proposing to rely on the
published accounts, however, a disclaimer would operate, not as
an exemption from liability attaching by Tirtue of any rule of
law, but as negating any assumption of a duty of care" [42].
Thus, it may be possible for auditors to limit the extent of
their duty by issuing a suitable disclaimer.
------------------------
[38] per Cooke J. at p. 582
[39] ibid
[40] ibid
[41] ibid at p. 583
[42] ibid at p. 581
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Richmond P. approached the issue quite differently from the
other two members of the bench. He refused to recognise a duty
of care and took the view that "the evidence failed to disclose
circumstances which either make the auditors aware, or ought to
have made them aware, that the 1970 accounts were indeed required
as a basis for a take over offer" [43] and "that a mere general
possibility of that kind is not sufficient to give rise to a
special relationship" [44]. Thus, he focused on the use of the
information and required that the loss be suffered in a
transaction that involved a use of the information actually known
to the respondent at the time of preparing the information. This
test appears consistent with that suggested above and it is to be
hoped that Richmond P's view of the extent of the duty of care
will prevail. He was part of the majority who refused damages,
but this followed from his finding on the duty of care issue,
which meant that he did not need to consider the causation
question considered by Cooke J.
The Scott Group case is of great importance as it affirmed
the existence of a legal duty of care owed by auditors to third
party users of the audit opinion. The case appears to have
widened the class of persons that may take action against an
auditor for negligence in the conduct of the audit to include
------------------------
[43] per Richmond P. at p. 567
[44] ibid
21
persons who can prove that they reasonably relied upon the
auditor's opinion. This liability may arise even though the
auditor was unaware of the third party's existence or interest at
the time of the audit report, but the differing judgments have
left the position unclear.
In the English case of JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks, Bloom
and Co [45] the defendant firm of accountants had prepared an
audited set of accounts for JEB Fasterners Ltd where the
company's stock was reported at its net realisable value. This
figure was well above its cost, though the stock was described as
being valued at the lower of cost and net realisable value. As a
result the company's profit was overstated by over ~ 13,000 and
a loss was turned into a reported profit of £'11.25. The
company was taken over and the new owners sued the auditors,
alleging negligence in preparing and attesting the inaccurate
accounts.
In his judgment Woolf J. relied heavily upon the important
statement of principle concerning the circumstances in which a
duty of care could arise in the speech of Lord Wilberforce in
Anns v London Borough of Merton [46] noted above. Though this
------------------------
45 (1981) 3 All ER 289
46 Ope cit, note 16.
22
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[47] [1980] Ch 297
number of aspects of the preparation and attestation of the
the other two cases relied upon byand in Ross v Caunters [47],
Woolf J.
Wilberforce was quoted with approval in both the Scott Group case
Woolf J. found the auditors to have been negligent in a
"the appropriate test for establishing whether a duty
of care exists appears in this case to be whether the
defendants knew or reasonably should have foreseen at
the time the accounts were audited that a person might
rely on those accounts for the purpose of deciding
whether or not to take over the company and therefore
could suffer loss if the accounts were inaccurate.
Such an approach does place a limitation on those
entitled to contend that there has been a breach of
duty owed to them. First of all, they must have relied
on the accounts and, second, they must have done so in
circumstances where the auditors either knew that they
would or ought to have known that they might.
As in the Scott Group case Woolf J. found that, the auditors
case did not concern accountants or auditors the speech of Lord
accounts and stated the principle to be applied in the case as:
should have been aware of the possibility of a takeover because
of the company's circumstances and that they owed a duty of care
to the potential acquirer even though they were unaware of any
[48] per Woolf J. at p. 296
They did know of the company's liquidity problems and that it was
actual takeover activity at the time the accounts were prepared.
seeking outside financial support from the plaintiff, but not of
------------------------
the plaintiff's intention to acquire the company. Here again, as
in the Scott Group case, there was no award of damages against
the auditors because of what Woolf J. described as the causat ion
issue.
The causation issue concerned the extent of reliance placed
upon the accounts in the takeover of JEB Fasteners. Woolf J.
took the view that the acquirer knew, or should have known, that
the accounts were inaccurate, from enquiries made during the
course of negotiations and "the fact that the company was not
breaking even must have become clearly apparent although the
figures which were being used were very approximate and, to a
large extent, estimated figures" [49]. Accordingly he found
that "the negligence of the defendants was not causative of any
loss " [50J and that the acquirers may have relied theon
accounts and been influenced by them but "that you can be
influenced by something even though if you had not been
influenced you would have acted in the same way" [51J.
Consequently, there was no award of damages against the
defendants, indicating the difficulties faced by third parties in
proving all the elements required for a successful action in
negligence.
------------------------
[49] per Woolf J. at p. 305
[50] ibid at p. 305
[51] ibid at p, 305
24
25
The other unusual case in which an auditor was found to have
importance in understanding the limitations of the initial
Further, the
and his decision on the extent of duty may not add
The causation issue and the award of damages, were the
subject of an appeal in JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks, Bloom 6. Co
[52], where the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of Woolf J.
on the causation issue, though criticising the method of approach
adopted. The narrow ground of the appeal is of primary
judgment. The Court of Appeal did not uphold Woolf J.'s finding
of negligence or his decision concerning the duty of care, as
supporting the line of approach adopted in the Scott Group case,
but as a decision of a single justice of the High Court of
neither of these issues were before the Court. Thus, the initial
England it may not be followed by higher courts and may have only
decision in the JEB Fasteners [53] case remains important in
limited persuasive power in future legal action.
Court of Appeal was critical of the method of approach adopted by
Woolf J.,
much to our present understanding.
[52] [1983] 1 All ER 583
[53] [1981] 3 All ER 289
breached a duty of care owed to a third party, and which resulted
[54] [1983] Scots Law Times Reports 98
this case Twomax acquired a controlling interest in another
in the award of damages against the auditor, was the Scottish
case of Twomax Ltd v Dickson, McFarlane and Robinson [54]. In
------------------------
company, Kintyre Knitwear Ltd, and two years later, around the
end of 1975; Kintyre went into receivership and later liquidation
after the audited accounts had shown a trading loss of ~ 88,000.
The pursuers in the case alleged that the 1973 reported profit
was a myth, and that they had relied on the audited accounts in
deciding to invest in Kintyre.
In his judgment Lord Stewart stated that:
"The nub of their case is contained in the following
arguments: 'Because of the defenders' said failures to
observe the duties of competent company auditors, the
figures presented in the said accounts of Kintyre
Knitwear Ltd were grossly misleading and produced a
seriously distorted picture of the company's affairs.
Instead of trading profitably the said Kintyre Knitwear
Ltd had in fact been trading at a loss both before and
after the purchase of the said shares by the first-
named pursuers in 1973 ••• '-
In the course of his judgment Lord Stewart considered
certain aspects of the 1973 audit in detail and concluded that
overseas commissions owed by Kintyre had been understated by
13,200 and the failure of the auditors to detect this was
'because of slack and careless auditing methods' [55] which
'raised a presumption of negligence' [56]. He also noted that
the auditor 'Mr McFarlane made no attempt to circularise any
debtors for the 1973 audit' [57], that the provision for bad or
doubtful debts was understated by t367 and that "the smallness






to support the conclusion, Lord Stewart found that:
some
the onlywereamounting to i 3,567,
This last comment played an important part in
He found that the large trading loss revealed in
1t 64,000) in March 1975 and evidence advanced that
These two errors,
part of this should have been written off in prior years.
about
judgment" [58].
Given the shortcomings of the company's records
combined with the shortcomings of the defenders'
methods, to which I shall refer, the conclusion I reach
is that in fact no such enormous loss was incurred
during the third year but the high probability is that
both the two earlier years had been unprofitable or at
the best only marginally profitable" [61].
the final judgment because of a large write-off of bad debts (of
of that sum may be due more to good luck than to good
specific errors found in the 1973 accounts but Lord Stewart
accepted argument "that the profits in the year to 31 March 1973
are substantially overstated in the audited accounts" [59]
despite the lack of detailed evidence in support of this
1975 was "arrived at by compensation for and correction of errors
conclusion.
from previous years" [60]. Despite the lack of specific evidence




He then went on to declare that he was "satisfied that the
accounts of. 31 March 1973 were negligently prepared by the
defenders and negligently audited by Mr McFarlane" [62], and also
that the auditor had failed to exercise reasonable care and skill
in the audit and that his methods were 'sadly wanting'.
The conclusion of negligence appears to have been supported
by the evidence of what the aud Lto r had done in relation to the
act1vities expected of a normally competent auditor, and this
finding of negligence appears an appropriate one in view of the
evidence. lrowever, the Court was not presented with specific
evidence to support the conclusion on the 1975 accounts, and this
part of the judgment, based on deduction from purely
circumstant ial evidence, could be consIde red unusual.
In der.iding that the auditors owed a legal duty of care to
the pursuers, Lord 'Stewart placed considerable weight upon" the'
comment s of Lord Wilberforce in Anns v Merton London Borough
Council noted above , again emphasising the importance of this
jud~ent in determining a professional person's duty to third
parties. This established a framework for consideration of the
Scott Group case; Woolfe J's judgment in the JEB Fasteners case
and Ross V Cauntel."s, and these last three cases provided the
legal basis for the finding that iir McFarlane owed a prima facie
duty of care in the auditing of the 1973 accounts" [63].
'--------------_._----
[62] ibid
[63] per Lord Stewart at p. 105
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This appears to have extended the duty
Further, the judgment of a single justice of the
Lord Stewart also observed "that Mr McFarlane
a duty of care was owed.
Outer House of the Scottish Court of Session is not binding upon
problems for auditors, but it is likely that future courts may
prefer a narrower view of the class of persons who are owed a
pursuers were members of the class of potential investors to whom
accounts might be relied on by a potential investor for the
Damages of 1 33,000 were awarded against the auditors, to
persons to whom a duty of care is owed may present considerable
of care to include all potential investors. Such a wide class of
purpose of deciding whether or not to invest" [64] and that the
duty of care.
any English or other Commonwealth court and may have only limited
plus interest, as Lord Stewart found that "the proper way of
fully compensate the pursuers for the cost of the shares bought
looking at it is that each pursuer lost the sum paid for the
[64] ibid
[65] per Lord Steward p. 106
the lack of serious discrepancies proved in the 1973 accounts and
shares as soon as the payment was made" [65].
basis of the inaccurate 1973 accounts an independent appraisal of
surprising in view of the circumstantial nature of the evidence,
Lord Stewart's comment that "I also bear in mind that even on the
the accounts concluded that investment in Kintyre was a
gamble" [66]. One may well ask why gamblers should be
compensated when their wager went astray! This perspective again
leads to the view that the case was unusual and that it should
not be viewed with alarm by auditors, as the decision itself may
not be very influential.
These two cases, JEB Fasteners and Twomax, may not be
followed by higher courts, and their significance cannot easily
be appraised at this stage. Unfortunately they do indicate
the acceptance of a simple 'foreseeability' rule in cases of
negligent mis-statement and highlight the importance of Lord
Wilberforce's statement in Anos concerning the approach to be
adopted in negligence actions. The application of a single
, foreseeability' rule to all negligence actions would be
inappropriate because of the different circumstances surrounding
the various actions encompassed by the tort of negligence, and
the majority in the Canadian Supreme Court and in the New Zealand
Court of Appeal seemed to be aware of the problem and prepared to




It has been argued above that a duty of care in cases
involving negligent mis-statement which results in economic loss
should be based upon a test which has regard to the preparers
knowledge of the proposed use of the information and of the class
of persons who could be expected to use the information. A duty
of care should only be found to exist if the pre parer of the
information has actual knowledge of the intended use of the
information and the information is used by a member of a
foreseeable class of users for the specific purpose known to the
pre parer.
There is support for this approach in the judgment of
Richmond P. in the Scott Group case, and the other member of the
majority, Cooke J., was not prepared to apply a simple test based
upon a 'reasonably foreseeable' user. He did not require actual
knowledge of the use of the information but the judgment does
indicate that the preparer's knowledge of the intended use, or at
least a foreseeable use of the information, was important.
Cooke J. appeared to require that the information be used by a
limited class of foreseeable users in a transaction that was
'reasonably foreseeable' by the preparer of the information at
the time of preparation.
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The majority judgment in Haig v Bamford, read by Dickson J.,
is also consistent with the suggested requirement that knowledge
of the proposed use of the information is an essential
requirement for a duty of care to be owed by the preparer of
information to a third party user. The deci~ive consideration in
the case appeared to be that the "accounts were prepared for the
guidance of a "specific class of persons" ••• in a "specific class
of transactions" •••• [67], and that the loss occured in the very
transaction that the accounts were prepared to influence. Thus,
the preparer and auditor of the accounts knew of the purpose for
which the accounts were required, and the loss was suffered by a
member of the foreseeable class of users who relied on the
information to provide the equity capital needed by the company.
Such a limit to the duty of care owed by accountants to
third parties should not be too onerous, as it would impose
liability for negligent mis-statements in a way that was
consistent with the need to control professional performance
without creating an indeterminate liability to all users at any
time and in an open-ended amount, the primary concern of Cardozo
C.J. in Ultramares. The liability should be such as to
compensate a limited class of foreseeable users for their losses,
without creating havoc in the profession. The fears raised by
the JEB Fasteners & Twomax cases are real, and it is to be hoped
that courts follow the more reasonable line of Richmond P. in the
Scott Group case.
------------------------
[67] (1976) 72 DLR (3rd) 68, per Dickson J. at p. 76
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